Why should an absolutist state worry about scal transparency? Why s houl danabso l u tiststatebein teres teding ettin gi tstaxa ti onpo li c yacross t ot h et a x p a y e r s ?W a sa n ys o r to fc o n t r o lm e c h a n i s mw i e l d e do v e ri t s taxationpolicy ?Historiansha v etendedtoansw ertheseques tionsinterms of state construction. A simplistic dichotomy between parliamentary states andabsolutiststateshasledmanyhistorianstoruleouttheverypossibility o fa n ya b s o l u t i s ts t a t ew o r r y i n ga b o u t s c a lt r a n s p a r e n c y .I nt h e o r ya n absolutiststatehadnocurb,controlorinstitutionalrestrictionwhatsoeverto t h ee nf o r c e m e n to fi t st ax a t i o np o l i c y .Pr e c i s e l yb e c a u s eo fthi su nl imi t e d capacityof scalactionithadnoneedeithertoexplainitstaxationpolicyto taxpayers.Morerecentlyithasbeenarguedthatthewillofastatealonewas notenoughinitselftobringinsigni canttaxchanges.Thew orkofPatrick O ' B ri e norS tep he nCo n w a y ,f ore x am p l e ,hass h o wnthati tw asneces s ary toin v o l v etax pa y ersinthetax ati o npo li c y .AstheEn glis he x amp l es ho w s , acertainconsensusbetweenstateandtaxpayersabouttheadvantageofany scalchange,whetherintermsofprotectionoropportunities,wasessential.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h i sn e ww a yo fl o o k i n ga tt h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e n t h ep o l i t i c a lr e g i m ea n dt a x a t i o np o l i c y ,a n da sJ o ë lF é l i xh a ss h o w nf o r mid-eighteenth century France, the absolutist state also stood in need of ac o n s e n s u s ,b u tad i f f e r e n ts o r to fc o n s e n s u s .T o d a yi ti sa r g u e dt h a tt h e a b s o l u t i s ts t a t ew o u l ds e e kc o n s e n s u so n l yw i t ht h er e v e n u e -c o l l e c t i n g middle men. This would be a limited consensus, involving pacts with speci c groups (whether public institutions or private groups). An absolutist s t a t e ,t h e r e f o r e ,w o u l ds t i l ln o tn e e dt oc o m m u n i c a t ei t st a x a t i o np o l i c y changestotaxpayersthemselves.Sincetherewasnotypeofcommunication o rt a x p a y e ri n v o l v e m e n ti nt h et a x a t i o np o l i c y ,t h ec o n s e q u e n c ew o u l db e thattax pa y erso fabso l u tis ts tatesw oul ds y s temati call yo pposean yc han g e inthetaxationpolicy .Absenceof scaltransparency ,ther ef ore ,w asasine quanonofunderstandingtaxationpolicyinabsolutiststates.
D o e st h i sh o l dt r u ef o ra l l s c a ls t a t e s ?L e t ' sl o o ka tt h ee x a m p l eo f eighteenth-centurySpain,clearlyanabsolutiststate.Andlet' saskthesame q u e s t i o n :d i dt h eS p a n i s ha b s o l u t i s ts t a t eh a v ea n yn e e do fe x p l a i n i n gt o i t st ax p a y e r st h er e a s o n sb e hi n di t st ax a t i o np o l i c y ?D i dt h eS p ani s hs t a t e ha v ean ytypeo fconcernorsens i ti vi tyabou tthereacti ono fi tstaxpa y ers ? I no t h e rw o r d s ,d i dt h eS p a n i s ha b s o l u t i s ts t a t ep r a c t i c ea n yt y p eo f s c a l transparency? W eh a v ea d d r e s s e dt h i sp r o b l e mb ya n a l y s i n ga ne x t r e m ec a s e : the moment of the biggest eighteenth-century hike of the Spanish Real Hacienda' sm o s ti m p o r t a n ts o u r c eo fi n l a n dr e v e n u e .I nN o v e m b e r1 7 7 9 t h eS p a n i s hg o v e r n m e n td e c r e e dat a xi n c r e a s et od e f r a yt h ew a rt h a t brokeoutagainstGreatB ri taininJ uneo fthesamey ear .Inth eopiniono f Miguel Artola, "the most convenient option was taken", upping by one third the amount the state received from Rentas Provinciales y Equivalentes ( p r o v i n c i a lc o n s u m e rt a x e si nC a s t i l ea n de q u i v a l e n tt a x e si no t h e r regions). 1 A r t o l aa r g u e st h a ti tw o u l ds e e mp e r f e c t l yl o g i c a lf o rt h es t a t e to nance warfare expenditure by raising taxes and that the state found it e a s yt od os ob ym e an so fa3 3 .3 %r a tehik e .Art o l ar e g ar d edthi sa se a s y tounderstand.Afterall,wearedealingherewithanabsolutestatethatcan pursue the arbitrary policy it wishes; i.e., tweak state revenue as much as i tl i k e dw h e n e v e ri td e e m e d t t i n gt od os o . T oassumethatCharlesIII'sstatecouldraisetaxrateswhenandhowit wished is to accept that the Bourbons pursued a policy of scal absolutism, oratleastwereinapositiontodoso .Theaimofthisarticleispreciselyto plumbthetruthofthishypothesis,i.e., to ndoutwhetherornotCharlesIII's government could really afford to give free rein to this scal absolutism. It seemstime l ytoaskthisq ues ti onno wbecauseArto la ' sthes i shasrecen tl y come under re on two grounds: rstly the degree of arbitrariness allowed b ya b s o l u t i s ma n ds e c o n d l yt h ee a s ew i t hw h i c ha na b s o l u t eg o v e r n m e n t couldraisetaxrates.
First and foremost there is a growing number of historians who shed doubtonthisknee-jerkequationofabsolutegovernments,likeCharlesIII's, a n dt h eu n t r a m m e l l e df r e ew i l lt oc h a n g et a xs y s t e m sa n dr a t e s .A s H o f f m a na n dN o r b e r gc o n c l u d e ,w i t ht h eF r e n c hc a s ei nm i n d :" t a x a t i o n and despotism were, in the last analysis, incompatible". 2 It would seem to beclearbynowthattheproblemwasnotthepoliticalmodel,oratleastnot a l o n e .T h ed i s c o v e r yt h a ta b s o l u t es t a t e si nf a c th a dm o r ed i f c u l t yt h a n p a r l i a m e n t a r ys t a t e si nc h a n g i n gt h e i rt a x a t i o np o l i c yh a so p e n e du pa n i n t e r e s t i n gd e b a t ea b o u tw h yp r e c i s e l yt h en o n -a b s o l u t i s ts t a t e sl ik eG r e a t BritainortheNetherlandsw ereabletomodifyandmobilisetheirtaxation resources far more successfully. 3 Asthingscurrentl ystandinthisongoing research,everythingseemstoindicatethat,ratherthanstrictlyaquestionof 1.
M. ARTOLA,1982 ,p.330. 2. P. HOFFMAN &K.NORBERG,1994 ,p.306. 3. M. DINCECCO,2009 ,p.48-103.ThecomparisonwiththeSpanishcaseisessential: R. TORRES,2015 thepoliticalregime,whatreallymatteredwasthelowerdegreeofopposition to taxation changes in non-absolute states. The differences between states seemtoresideabo v eallinthele v elsofpoliticalandeconomicelites ,both local and national. 4 N o n -a b s o l u t es t a t e s ,i no t h e rw o r d s ,m i g h tp u r s u ea scalpolicyjustasarbitraryasanabsolutestate ,butitse nforcementcame upagainstmuchlesssocialoppositionandwasevenhelpedbyanopenand self-interested enforcement participation and consensus from the elites. 5 Limitstothetaxationpolicy ,therefore,didnotliesomuchinanycountry' s p a r t i c u l a rc o n s t i t u t i o n a ls t r u c t u r eb u tm o r es oi nt h eg r o u p ss u s t a i n i n g political power, legalising the scal-change measures and expediting their e n f o r c e m e n to re v e nd i r e c t l yp r o m o t i n ga n dp a r t i c i p a t i n gi nt h e m . 6 To put it in a nutshell, therefore, the important point about Charles III's scal absolutism was not whether or not it was arbitrary but whether or not it couldbeeffectivelyenforced.
Secondly,theideaof"convenience"attributedbyArtolatothiswarfaren a n c i n gt a xh i k eh a sa l s ob e e nb r o u g h tu n d e rt h es p o t l i g h to fr e c e n t his tori calresearc han df o un dw an tin g .T os tartwi ththerei sn o wacertain consensus that taxation was not the most ef cient warfare-nancing method in the eighteenth century. 7 IntheEnglishcase,whichhasbeenmostclosely studied ,thisoptionw astakenupearl y ,bute v eninFranceth eg o v ernment w a su n a b l et of a l lb a c ko nt a xr e v e n u et oa f f r o n tt h ec o n i c t .A sR i c h ar d Bonneyargues,pastexperiencehadtaughttheFrenchgovernment(butany other European state might have plausibly learnt the same lesson), that the newtaxeswouldnotrakeinenoughmoneyquickenoughto nanceawar . 8 T h eo n l yw a yt oc h a n g et h i ss i t u a t i o nw o u l dh a v eb e e nt os t e a lam a r c h on events by changing the taxation policy before the war, but diplomatic watchdogs would have seen any such move as a formal declaration of war. 9 An yw artim etaxhik ew o ul dh a v es e rv ed ,a tbe s t ,f o rh e l p in gt op a y o f fw a r t i m e -c o n t r a c t e dd e b t sa f t e r w a r d s .T h ew a r f a r e -n a n c i n gt a xh i k e decreedb yCharlesIIIcannotbeseenasaniso latedandalmos tautomatic measure. To understand its real nature it needs to be studied in the historical 4 . A sa r g u e db yJ .G LETE,2 0 0 7 ,p .8 7 -1 0 8 .T h eo r i g i no ft h i st h e s i sc a nb ef o u n di n R. LACHMAN, 2000. 5. This thesis is well explained in P. K. O'BRIEN,201 1 ,p.408-446. 6 . T h i si sb o r n eo u tb ya n a l y s i n gt h et a x a t i o nc h a n g e sb o u n du pw i t ht h ec r e a t i o no f public debt, where consensus of the participants in the creation and sustaining thereof was essential.ThisisthethesisofD. STASAVAGE,2003. 7. T. J. A. LE G OFF,1 9 9 9 ,p .3 7 7 -4 1 3 .S e et h ec o m m e n t so nt h i si s s u ei nS .C ONWAY & R. TORRES,201 1 ,p.9-30. 8. R. BONNEY, 2004 , p. 191-215. 9. J. FÉLIX,2006 contextinwhichitwaseffectivelyagreedandenforced.Neithercanthistax hikebewrittenoffasacon v enientmeasure .Considerationh astobegiv en t os u c hf a c t o r sa st h er e a lr e v e n u e -r a i s i n gc a l c u l a t i o n so ft h ea u t h o r i t i e s , w h i c hw ec a nc h e c ka g a i n s ti t se n f o r c e m e n t ,i t se f c a c yi nr a i s i n gt h i s c al c ul a teds um ,th es peedan dth em e th odsp u tin t oprac ti ce .Th ef ac tth a t therew asanordertoraisetaxrates ,inotherw ords ,cannots tandal oneas anexplanationofthattaxationpolicy.Weneedalsotofactorinthedesignof thetaxationchange,howthistaxhikewasactuallyenforcedandwhatwere t h ec o n s e q u e n c e so ft h em e a s u r e .S t u d y i n gap a r t i c u l a rt a x a t i o nc h a n g e fr o mth em o m e n ti tw a sd e c i d e du p o nt oth em o m e n ti tw a se nf o r c e dan d therevenuereceivedcangiveussomerevealinginsightsintothetruenature of Charles III's absolutism. 10
1.Thedelayinbringinginthetaxhike
D e s p i t et h ea r b i t r a r ya u t h o r i t yi m p l i c i t l ya n de x p l i c i t l ya t t r i b u t e db y Artola to Charles III's government, those in charge of his taxation policy weremuchlesssureoftheirground.AftertheendofthewartheSecretario de Estado himself, Conde de Floridablanca, with the recent experience of having implemented the biggest scal change of his government, wrote th a t"th eo pe ra ti o no fin cr e as in go rc h an gin gtax e s[ … ]i so n eo fth em o s t serious, most dif cult and riskiest measures that might be taken within thisvastmonarchyofours" . 11 For the head of Charles III's government the decisiontotamperwithataxw asnotri ingmatter;innow a yw asiteasy andconvenientand,judgingfromhisownwords,neededtobeapproached with the utmost caution.
A sar e s u l to ft h i sm i n d s e t ,r a i s i n gt a x e sw a sb yn om e a n st h e r s tresortf orChar l esIII ' sg o v ernmen t .In1 7 7 9theorderw en to u tf oraJunta "gratuitous" donations, lotteries, life annuity funds in the Americas and d i v e r s es a l e so ft i t l e s ,j o b s ,encomiendas (grant of right to tributes and r e v e n u e )a n dg r a c e si nt h eA m e r i c a sa n di nas i g n i c a n tn i n t ha n dt e n t h p l a c e ,a3 3 %i n c r e a s ei nth eRentas Provinciales "of Castile and Aragon" a n dat a xo ns p i r i t sa n dl i q u e u r s .S i g n i c a n t l y ,a n o t h e rJunta de Medios h e l dinl ateJ un e1 7 7 9di dn o te v e nme n ti o ntaxin creases . 13 It would seem that the government was working from the idea that any warfare-nancing resourcewasvalidprovidingitinvolvednotaxincreases.
The Secretario de Estado's written thought must have been a deepseated maxim of Charles III's government, because the most surprising a s p e c to ft h i sw h o l et a x -h i k ei s s u ei sp r e c i s e l yh o wl o n gi tt o o kf o rt h e g o v e r n m e n tt ob r i n gi ti n .A l t h o u g ht h ew a rb e g a ni nJ u n e1 7 7 9 ,t h e government did not give the tax-hike order until mid-November of this year. Thisdelaydoesnotseemlogicalinthecircumstances,especiallyinviewof the fact the revenue was likely to take some time to lter through the system. country. These pools of savings, with the government's established right to tapintothem,haddefrayedSpain ' svariouscon ictssince1 77 4(Moroccan attackontheNorthAfricanstrongholds,expeditiontoAlgeriain1 77 5and t oR í od el aP l a t ai n1 7 7 6 )b u tt h es o u r c ew a sn o wru n n i n gd ry .W h e t h e r becausethegovernmentcon dentlyexpectedthewartobeoverquicklyor p r e f e r r e do t h e r n a n c i n gs o u r c e sa n dm i s t r u s t e dt h et a x a t i o no p t i o n ,t h e truthisthatCharlesIII ' sgo v ernmentdalliedsixmonthso v erthetaxhike . 
The search for legitimacy
CharlesIII,asanabsolutemonarch,hadallthenecessaryso vereignty , legitimacyandauthoritytodecreeanincreaseintaxrates.Intheory ,neither th em o n arc hn o rhi sg o v ernme n tw asbo un dtoas kan yo th erins t i tu ti o nto v ouchsaf ethisdecisionornegotiatei tsenf orcement.Char lesIIIw asmuch freerthanhisrivalGeorgeIIIwhenitcametochanginghissubjects'taxation situation.Spainwasstillfarfrombeinga"checkedleviathan" ,whereasthe U n i t e dK i n g d o mw a ss h o w i n gt h e r s ts i g n so fb e i n gs o . 16 Despite these advantages, the government's political practice was surprisingly coy, falling w i t h i np a r a m e t e r so fb e h a v i o u rt h a tw em i g h td u b" s c a lp a t e r n a l i s m " . Thepress in gneedsre f erredtointhedecreedi dnotstemso le l yfrom t h ew a rw i t ht h eE n g l i s h ,i n i t i a t e do v e rs i xm o n t h sb a c k .T h ed e c r e ea l s o invokedthebacklogofcostsbuiltupsincethe"costlyexpeditionstoAfrica and the Americas". By stressing the longer timeframe of the urgency the government was trying to emphasise the king's ongoing fund-raising effort u pt ot h a tt i m e ,w i t h o u tf a l l i n gb a c ko nt h eo p t i o no ft a xi n c r e a s e s .T h i s highlighted the state's paternalistic function of protecting its subjects at no c o s tt oth e man dal s ob r o u gh to u tb o thth ein e v i ta b ili tyan dj u s ti c eo fthi s risenowthatallthestate' sotherresourceshadbeenmilkeddry .
T h ew r i t e r so ft h i sd o c u m e n to p e n l yt a b l e dt h ej u s t i c eo ft h i st a x i n c r e a s eb e c a u s e ,i nt h eg o v e r n m e n t ' sv i e w ,t h ew a ru n d e r t a k e nw a s i n t r i n s i c a l l yj u s tt o o .T h eE n g l i s ha n dt h eE n g l i s ha l o n e ,i tw a sa r g u e d , were the warmongers here, since they had been provoking the Spanish an da tta c kin g" m yAm e ri c and o m ain ss in c e1 7 7 0 " ,w hi c h ,ash ee x p r e s s l y a c k n o w l e d g e d ,i m p e r i l l e dt h ep o s s e s s i o n so fb o t hw o r l d sa n d" t h eg o o d s andtradeofm ybelo v edsubjects" .B yusingthisargumentthego v ernment waspresentingthecon icttotaxpayersasadefensiveratherthanoffensive w a r ;i tw a sj u s tt od e f e n do n e s e l f ,e s p e c i a l l yw h e nw h a tw a sa ts t a k ew a s the monarchy's most coveted possession: its colonies. This rhetoric is very differentfromtheEnglishgovernment'stax-hikejusti cationoratory,which preferred to coax taxpayers into supporting an expansive project that would boost economic opportunities. 19 An all-in-this-together political rhetoric wasnotreallyonthecardsintheSpanishcase.
Oncethejusticeofthiswarhadbeenestablished,theSpanishgovernment t h e nh a dt od e t a i lh o wi tw o u l db ek e p tu pa n dw h ob y .C h a r l e sI I I ' s 18. Acopyofthedecree,MiguelMúzquiz,SanLorenzo,17-11-1779 ,enAHN,Hacienda, Libro 8031, f. 499-500. 19. S. CONWAY,2006 government expressly declared in this decree that it behoved the government i t s e l ft os e e kw a r f a r e -f u n d i n gr e s o u r c e s ,w h i c hw o u l db ed o n ei fp o s s i b l e without increasing the tax burden. The principle of taxes only as a last-ditch effort was therefore made explicit right from the word go. The sequence here iscrucial.ItisinthischaracteristictraitthattheSpanishgovernmentstands o u tf r o mo t h e rE u r o p e a nc o u n t r i e s ,w h e r er a i s i n gt a x e sw a st h e r s tt h i n g done after declaring war because state creditworthiness was guaranteed ( b o t hf o ra t tr a c t i n gf u n d sa n db a c ki n gu pt h ei s s u eo fp u b l i cd e b t ) . 20 Quite on the contrary, in all the con icts during Charles III's reign (Seven Year's W arandpost -1 77 4con icts )taxrisesw erethelast -ditchme asurewhenthe s t a t e ' sl i q u i dr e s o u r c e sa n ds a v i n g sh a dru no u t . 21 As Charles III expressly recognisedtojustifythelast-ditcheffortofaskingtaxpa yerstohelp nance thewar:"I ndmyselfintheinex orableneedofaskingmycoun trymenfor h e l pa f t e rs a v i n gt h e mf r o ma n ye n c u m b r a n c eo v e rm a n yy e ar s " .Pr o b a b l y this was what Charles III's government really thought.
This self-justi catory rhetoric reached its peak with the arguments brandished to keep both arbitrista thinkers and taxpayers themselves h a p p y :d e m o n s t r a t i n gu n e q u i v o c a l l yt h a tt h et a xw o u l db ee n f o r c e di na j u s ta n de v e n -h a n d e dw a y( ac r u c i a la r g u m e n tt og l e a nac e r t a i np u b l i c consensus and second-guess the government's own legitimacy). For a start thetaxwasgivenatimelimit;itwouldbeenforcedonlyduring1 780.This time limit is important because this hike has traditionally been presented as an opportunity for the government to reform the Rentas Provinciales, ap r oce s sth a te v e n tuall yl edt oLe r e n a ' s1 7 8 5r e f o rm . 22. As Pegerto Saavedra has suggested, the one-third increase in these taxes was a f ortunate rs ts tep ,s u bseq ue n tl yro un dedo u tb yLere na ' s1 7 8 5re f orm .P .S AAVEDRA,2 007 , p.843.FormoreinformationonLerena' sreformseeA. GONZÁLEZ ENCISO,2009 ,p.249-268. 23. Thetax-hikerenewalordersinMadrid,24-12-1780,AGS,SSH,Leg.1741and21-11-1781 in AGS, SSH, Leg. 1742 and 27-11-1782 in AGS, SSH, Leg. 1744 this revocation was also illogical, because it was precisely with the return of peacethatthestate' sdebtsandpaymentdefaultsgangedupmosturgently .
Political denial of warfare-fuelled nancial urgencies can best be understood from a paternalistic vision of politics. This at least was the interpretation made by the Archbishop of Granada when, after the end of the war, he weighed up the de nitive revocation of a tax that had been renewed for yearly terms since late 1779. In an equally paternalistic tone he opinedthatrevocationoftheExtraordinaria was a show of "your majesty's love of his subjects, whose deft policies now surprise us anew with another public bene t comparable only to the state's generous pardon of one thirdinyourtaxpayers'burden,imposedthereononlyduetotheurgenciesofwar andmuchtothechagrinofyourcompassionateheart." 24 T h i sl i m i t e dt e r mo ft h en e wt a xi sy e ta n o t h e rf e a t u r et h a ts t a n d s out from the scal measures adopted by the enemy, where the new taxes endedupgraftedforgoodonthe scalstructure,insofarastheyhadnotime limi tan dw e r eti edinw i thth en eedo fp a y in go ffth ep u b li cd e b tb uil tu p during the war. 25 Bothg o v ernments ,inotherw ords ,madetaxchan g esbut CharlesIII' swasnotbroughtinatthestartofthewarandwasdecreedwith abuilt-intimelimit. A n yt a xt h a ta i m sa te v e n -h a n d e d n e s sa n df a i r n e s sc a n n o ta f f o r dt o l e a v eo u ta n yg r o u po ft a x p a y e r s ,o ra tl e a s td u ea rr a n g e m e n t sh a v et ob e made to charge them in another way. The decree therefore explained, to preempt any grievances against privileged taxpayers, such as the church, that these were exempt from the new tax for now because other "more ef cient" t ax e sh a db e e nl e v i e do nt h e m .Inan yc a s et h ed e c r e eb yn om e an sru l e d out including them within this tax later; indeed the Secretaría de Hacienda was already working towards this end. al s ol a ybe hin dth ef e l tn eedt oj u s tify ,inM a dri d ' sc a s e ,th ee x e m p ti o no f some staples. 28 J u s ta si m p o r t a n ta st h em a n i f e s tw i l lt om a k es u r ee v e r y o n ep a i d theirbitwasthesecureestablishmentoftherevenuecollectionmethod.As i tl a t e rt r a n s p i r e d ,t h eg o v e r n m e n ti nf a c tf e a r e dt h a tt h i sn e wt a xw o u l d e n du ps t r e n g t h e n i n gn o n -s t a t e -c o n t r o l l e dr e v e n u ec o l l e c t i o nm e t h o d s , affecting the poorest taxpayers despite the spirit of the law. The government k n e wa n df e a r e dt h a tu n c o n t r o l l e dh e a dt a x e s( repartos/repartimientos) and lump-sum payments (encabezamientos)o rn e wc o n s u m e rt a x e sc o u l d have disastrous effects on local economies and the worst-off. Once more the paternalist spirit shines through and the state allowed the towns to dip into the surplus funds of Propios y Arbitrios (local land revenue) in the local coffers. A subsequent instruction sent out to intendentes made the situationevenclearer:thereasonforusingthesurplusofPropios y Arbitrios a sam e a n so fp a y i n gt h en e wt a xw a s" t oa v o i du n t o w a r de n c u m b r a n c e of taxpayers". 29 therewerepresumablymorereasonsthanmerelyapaternalistoutlookurging the state to authorise use of these local resources for payment of this tax.
Iftheo v erridingobjectofany scalpolicywastoraisetherev enueas q u i c k l ya n de f c i e n t l ya sp o s s i b l e ,C h a r l e sI I I ' sg o v e r n m e n tt h o u g h tt od o s ob yco n sca tin gth es a vin g so fl ocalg o v ernme n ts .Th euseo fth e sel ocal resources, moreover, might help to dissuade local councils from taking out loans to pay taxes, i.e.,ru nni n gu pd e b t s .A v o i d i n gb o rr o w i n gb yconcejos h adbee npreci se l yth emainaimo fth eB o urbo ns 'l ocal n an cere f o rms .I t would therefore not seem reasonable for the state to give concejos full liberty indecidinghowtopaythenewtax,i.e.,themethod,becausethiswouldhave involved the risk of Spain's local councils running up more debt. In other words,thestatedecreedariseintaxesthatwasinfactatransferofrevenue.
Bygoingaboutitthiswaythestatewasalsopre-emptinglocalcouncils fromcreatingnewconsumertaxesorheadtaxestopaytheExtraordinaria
Contribución,apracticethatw ouldendupspreadingpanicanddiscontent a m o n gc o n s u m e r sa n dt a x p a y e r s .W ew o u l da r g u et h a tt h es t a t eh a d plumpedforapaternalistapproachtotaxation(limitingdebtanddamageto consumers ) ,althoughthismeasuredoesnotcloakthearbitrarinessimplied inthispolicy(shakeupandcontroloflocal nancestodipintothematwill a f t e r w a r d s ) .T h ec o n s e q u e n c e so ft h i sd i s c o n c e r t i n gb u tu n d e r s t a n d a b l e wayofconceivingtaxationand nancesendedupworkingagainstthestate itself in the revenue-collection process.
A l lt h ep r e c a u t i o n st a k e nt oj u s t i f yt h eh i k ei nRentas Provinciales yE q u i v a l e n t etell us that the government did have a certain sensitivity towards any popular reaction to the enforcement thereof. Charles III's go v ernmenttosomee xtentreinedinitso wnpo w ersofabsolutedespotism andarbitrariness.Itprobablydidsoduetofearoftaxpayerreactionbutthe truthisthatthestatemadeanefforttovouchforitsowntaxationlegitimacy; suchsecond-guessingwasabsolutelyunnecessaryinlightofitsrealpowers.
The actual revenue-collection situation
CharlesIII' scautionanddamage-limitationapproachcontinuedwhen i tc am et om aki n gr e v e n u e -c o l l e c t i o narr an g e m e n t s .T os tar tw i thth etaxh i k ed e c r e ew a sr e p e a t e d l yp u tb a c kf o rf e a rt h a tt h eb a dw e a t h e ra n d drought the country was currently suffering from would increase taxpayer oppos i ti o n .Theg o v ernmen t ' sq ualmse v e nl edi ttohal tdis t ri b u ti o no fthe already printed decree to regional authorities until such time as the weather m i g h tc h a n g e ,e v e nt h o u g hi th a da l r e a d yb e e ns i g n e db yt h ek i n g . 33 The greatproblemforthegovernment,however,layinhowtoenforcethedecree. w a y by the north wind at dusk and the night is still cloudless. Before publishing the decree we deemit ttingthatitbeheldbackuntiltheendofthemonth,w atchingtheweatherreports in the interim throughout the whole country to see if the drought is to continue", Sáez del ParayuelotoMúzquiz,Madrid1 8-1 1-1 779 .AGS,SSH,Leg.2327 .
34. Múzquiz to Directores Generales de Rentas,15-1 1-1 779 ,AGS,SSH,Leg.2327 . 35. Exclusion was made of tercias (tithes), servicio ordinario (a property tax on commoners collected in Castile), spirit tax, situado (money transfers), población de Granada,sosaandbarilla,quinto de la nieve ( taxontheicebusiness ) ,silk,e xtractionand sugar.
36. SuchwasthecaseoftheGranadasilkrevenue,where"anyalterationmightundoall progress made in this highly appreciated business." Directores Generales de Rentas,J u an Matías de Arozarena and Sáez de Parayuelo to Miguel Múzquiz, 24-11-1779, AGS, SSH, Leg. 2327. 3 7 . " A f t e ry o u rm a j e s t y ' st r a n s f e rt ot h e mo ft h es p i r i tt a x . "Directores Generales de Rentas,J uanM a tí asdeAro zare n aan dS áe zdeP ara yu e l otoMi gu e lM úz q uiz ,24-1 1 -1 7 7 9 , AGS,SSH,Leg. This was not the only limit the government imposed on itself and, indeed, there were more exceptions. The most important was the case of Madrid, whose Rentas Provinciales were farmed out to the Cinco Gremios Mayores.I nM a d r i dt h eg o v e r n m e n t ' sf e a ro fa n yg r a s s r o o t sr e a c t i o nt o ac h a n g ei nt h et a xs t r u c t u r ew a sp a r t i c u l a r l ye v i d e n t .W i t hm e m o r i e so f theEsquilacheriotstillvividinitsmind, 39 the government clearly pleaded caution:"equivalentmeasureswithnoriskofincitingpopularunrestshould be sought". 40 T ohammerhomethispointitwasdecidedthattheexceptional m e t h o d sw o u l db ee n f o r c e do n l yi nt h ei n n e rc i t y ,w i t hg e n e r a lRentas Provinciales b e i n ga p p l i e dt ot h ep r o v i n c eo fM a d r i da saw h o l e .T h e Gremios wereauthorisedtolevyspecialconsumercharges,butoncea gain withthecaveatthat"thepoorerpeopleandtradesmenofMadridshouldnot s e et h e i rs t a p l e st hr e a t e n e db yt h eExtraordinaria Contribución". 41 In the end the Gremios wereallowedtolevythechargeonlyoncocoa,wine,wax, 3 9 .I n d e e dt h et a x a t i o n -f u e l l e du n r e s ta g a i n s tE s q u i l a c h es t e m m e dp a r t l yf r o mt h e a t t e m p t sm a d es i n c e1 7 6 2t oh i k eu pt h eRentas Provinciales J. ANDRÉS-GALLEGO,2 0 0 3 , p. 185.
40. Directores Generales de Rentas,JuanMatíasdeArozarenaandSáezdeParayuelo toMiguelMúzquiz,24-1 1-1 779 ,AGS,SSH,Leg.2327 . 41. Miguel Múzquiz to Directores Generales de Rentas,P a l a c i o ,2 0 -1 2 -1 7 7 9 ,A G S , DGR-II,Leg.6 10.
sugarandtextilesonthegroundsthat"thepoorerpeoplecanmostlyeschew suchgoodsandthechargethereforeencumbersmoresothebetteroffwho c a na f f o r ds a m e " . 42 A calculation was also made to ensure that the extra t a xs h o u l db ec o l l e c t e do n l yu n t i la d d i n gu pt oao n e -t h i r di n c r e a s ea n d shouldnotbeprolongedbeyondtheliabilityestablishedfortheinnercityof Madrid (1.9 million reales de vellón).Inotherwords,insteadoflevyingthe taxw h erei tw aslik e li e s ttoco n tri b u tem o s t ,s u c hasaco ns u mer -in te ns i v e built-uparea,equitywiththerestoftherealmwastheoverridingmotive,to avoidupsettingMadridresidents.Thiswastheexactopposi teprocedureto theEnglish,whotendedtolevytheirtaxeswherebusinessanddemandfor T h eg o v e r n m e n ts e tu pa" consejo particular"w i t h i nt h eConsejo de Castilla,c l o s e l yw a tc h edo v e rb yth eSecretaría de Hacienda, with the expressremitofurgentlydealingwithanydoubtsthro wnupb yauthorities o rtax p a y ers" asq ui c kl yaspo s s i b l ean dwi tho v erri din gpre f ere n cetoan y other business." 49 All the information generated was supposed to help the treasurer general, in liaison with the intendentes,tosupervisethecirculation of available capital. 50 Infact,however,whattheReal Hacienda was quickly ooded with was not local savings but rather intendentes'reportsw arning o ft h en o n -e x i s t e n c eo ft h eo s t e n s i b l y -a v a i l a b l ec a p i t a la n da s k i n gf o ra n extension of the payment deadline. From Barcelona the Barón de la Linde insistedonathree-foldphaseinoftheEquivalente payment, as had always been the custom with the Catastro,theprovincialtaxofCatalonia.Thetax hik ean dimm edi a tep a y m e n tth e r eo fasd ecr eed ,e x p l ain edth eintendente ofCatalonia,couldnotbedone"withoutalterationthereofinthiscase , 50. Onthecoordinatingroleofthetreasurersgeneral,seeR.T ORRES,2 012. 51 . BaróndelaLindetoMúzquiz,Barcelona8-12-1 779 .MúzquiztoLinde,Madrid22-12-1 779 ,AGS,SSH,Leg.999 . thanmakingitevenmoredif cultfortownsandtaxpayerstocomply ." 52 In the words of the intendente ofValencia,noonewassayingthattheaccounts presented to the Consejo de Castilla or intendentes were false; it was just thatthemoney ,physically ,wasnotthere :"thefundsdonotn o wexist"and t h a t" t h o s es u r p l u s e sw e r em a k e -b e l i e v e " . 53 The intendente of Catalonia cametoth ese lf s ameco n c l us i o n :"th eos te ns i b l es urp l uses ,inm os tto wns , donotactuallyexistinthecoffers" . 54
ThesituationwaspracticallythesamethroughoutthewholeofSpain. Themoneywasnon-existent,asitturnedout,becauseithadbeenspenton urgencies, unforeseen expenses or even expenses authorised by the Consejo de Castilla but then left out of the accounts sent to Madrid. Cádiz declared i t s e l ft ob ei n c a p a b l eo fp a y i n gi t sExtraordinaria due of 1,474,193 reales b e c a u s e ,w i t ht h ep e r m i s s i o no ft h eConsejo de Castilla,i th a di n v e s t e d a l lt h e1 7 7 8a n d1 7 7 9s u r p l u s e si ns t r e e t -c l e a n i n ga n d-p a v i n gw o r k . 55 Vélez Málaga had lent its 1778 surpluses to the "local harvesters of wine, raisins, almonds, gs, lemons and oranges" to promote their production and exportation. 56 Frommid-March1780,at rsttimidlyandthenopenly,thegovernment passedoninstructionstothe" consejo particular"f orittoacceptan ytype o ftaxo rd e b tp r o p o s e db yth eayuntamientos.Th ec a tal o gu eo fm e a s ur e s a d o p t e db yt o w n sa n dv i l l a g e st om e e tt h i s" Extraordinaria"p a y m e n t s w e ll edendl ess l y :hirin go f s hin gri gh tsintheRi v erT orm es , 60 exporting ofsosaandbarillainCartagena, 61 or, to take one more example, bull ghting in Seville. 62 The most frequent recourse however, in country towns, was the p l o u g h i n go fn e wa r a b l el a n da n dt h eu s eo ff u n d so rs a l eo fc e r e a l sa n d 58. AntonioCarrillodeMendozatoMiguelMúzquiz,Granada24-12-1779 .AGS,SSH, Leg. 1739 . We have used the "estado de cobranza" (charge statement) closest to the end of the month.AGS,SSH,Leg.1 739and1 740. money from the pósitos (local grain stores) 63 while cities tended to turn t op u b l i cd e b to rl e v yt a x e so nw i n ea n ds p i r i t s .E a c hc a s ew a sp r e t t ysui generis,however ,revealinglocalcouncilsofthattimetohaveawho lehost o fotherfuncti onsbes i desservin gl ocalres i den ts .T ak eth ecaseo fLéri da , w hi c has k edth e" Consejo Particular"f o rpe rmi s s i o nt op a yth eo n e-thir d increase under the Catastro,6 1 ,3 7 9reales,fromtheci ty ' sbri dg eto llfund (peazgo), since it had no Propios (localrev enue-generatingassets )and"no other means of coming up with the money". Asthewardraggedon,moreandmoreresourceswereneededandthe government, ying in the teeth of its own announcements, decided to extend the "Extraordinaria" for one year more during 1781, 66 this measure then being repeated in subsequent years for as long as the war lasted. 67 Although it was a mere extension, the Secretaría de Hacienda d e e m e di t t t i n gt o phaseinchangesinthere v enue-collectingarrangements ,l earningdirectl y fromthelessonsofthe rstyearofenforcementofthe" Extraordinaria".
F o ras t artt h es e l f -l e g i t i mi s i n gr h e t o ri co f1 7 7 9w a sn o wt o n e dri g h t down. The Secretaría de Hacienda devoted most of its extension order to e xp lainin gre v en ue-co llectionarran g emen ts ,no wqui tedi ff eren t .Thestate nowshowedmore exibilityinacceptingmeansofpayment.Itcontinuedto recommend that local councils should pay the contribution from the Propios 6 3 . W i t n e s st h et o w no fA r é v a l o ,w h i c hd e c l a r e dt h a ti th a dn os u r p l u s e st op a yt h e " Extraordinaria Contribución" ,e v e nth o u ghi tsq u o taw asam ode s ts umo f3 5 ,5 5 5reales. Neither could it raise this sum from local residents, "most of whom are humble day labourers" .Theonlyoptionleftwastoobtainpermissionfortakingthissumfromitspósito (grainstore ) ,whichatthatmomenthad290 ,000reales in cash and 7,000 anegas of wheat, Arevalo,10-4-1 780,AGS,SSH,Leg.1 739 .
64. The right of peazgo had been a propio (localrevenue-generatingasset)ofthecityof Léridasince1 4 3 2 ;in1 64 2thedecisionw astakentospendthi sre v enuehencef orthonci ty forti cation work. Although, like other towns and villages of the monarchy, it was ordered to regulate its propios i n1 7 6 6 ,t h i sw a sn e v e ri nf a c td o n e ,p a r t l yb e c a u s ei tc a m et ob e t a p p e di n t od i r e c t l y" yArbitriossurplusbutleftopenthepossibilityofthecounciltakingupnew l oansorl e vyin gne wtax es .Thes tatee v encoun tenancedthep oss i b ili tyo f inter-council loans "on a payback basis", against the surety of such new taxes as may be levied. As for the type of taxes, there was now no limit, barring the catch-all recommendation that councils "should give preference t om e a s u r e st h a ts t i m u l a t ea r a b l ea n dl i v e s t o c kf a r m i n gs u c ha sb r i n g i n g ne wlandundertheplough ,pasturelandenc losuresandotherofsimilarilk t h a td on o ti m p i n g eo nc o mm o n l a n dri g h t s " . 68 Wine and spirit taxes were also recommended, on the grounds that "these are by no means staples and excessive use therefore should rather be discouraged". Nonetheless, the Secretaría de Hacienda l e fti tu ptotheto wnstomak es uc htaxproposals a st h e yd e e m e d t t i n gi ne a c hc a s e ,a l w a y so nc o n d i t i o no fa v o i d i n gp o l l taxesandnot"overtaxingthestaplesofthepoor" .Lastly ,theSecretaría de Hacienda m a d eap o i n t e dr e m i n d e ra b o u tt h en e e do fr a p i dp a y m e n ta n d directlyblamedpaymentdelaysonthecouncils 'debtors,askingforgreater harshness to be used against them.
But the most telling measure of the extension order, in terms of r e e c t i n gt h ec h a n g ei nt h eg o v e r n m e n t ' so u t l o o k ,w a ss t a t ea u t h o r i s a t i o n of a de facto suspension of payments by councils of the whole of Spain. The I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX  X  XI  XII   1780   1781   1783 in million of Reales Some idea of the local dif culties in meeting this "Extraordinaria Contribución"c a nb eg a i n e df r o mt h ep a y m e n tb a c k l o g s ,b u i l d i n gu pa s timew enton .B ytheendof1 7 80 ,f ore xample ,the22pro vincesofCastile hadpaido v ertothestate86 %oftheir" Extraordinaria"duesf orthisy ear ( 3 1 , 1 5 3 , 7 1 0 ) ,t h er e s tb e i n gp a i db a c k d a t e di nl a t e ry e a r s .T h i sp a y m e n t p e r c e n t a g ef e l li nt h ef o l l o w i n gy e a r s ;i n1 7 8 1o n l y6 9 %o ft h es u md u e w a sa c t u a l l yp a i d ;i n1 7 8 26 2 . 9 %a n di n1 7 8 3o n l y5 2 % .T h i sd e c r e a s i n g ability to pay the "Extraordinaria"o nt i m em e a n tab u i l d -u po fp a y m e n t defaults and delays. The "Extraordinaria" must without doubt have become anincreasinglyheavyburdenforlocaltownsandtaxpayers.Inotherwords thestatenotonl yf ailedini tsattempttosparetaxpa y ersbu te v enf ailedto raisetheresourcesitneededquicklyenough,ceasingtoreceivethematall as the con ict wore on.
*
As t u d yo ft h ec e n t u r y ' sb i g g e s tt a xh i k es h e d sl i g h to nt h eS p a n i s h a b s o l u t i s ts ta t e ' stax a t i o np o li c y .Th em e a s ur ew a so ri g in all ytak e no nth e grounds that it would be an ef cient warfare-nancing method. The whole revenue-collection arrangement was steeped through in scal paternalism, aimingtoheadofftheleastsocialunrest 
